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Speaking of ‘Respect for Women’: 







 The aim of this paper is to examine how a language of ‗women‘s rights‘ entered 
into foreign policy discourses of the Bush Administration in the period of 2001-2004. 
Through a discursive analysis of speeches, press releases, interviews and written 
documents, I find that feminist-inspired language and concepts entered into the 
mainstream discourse on numerous occasions throughout this period, though usually in 
the service of other foreign policy objectives. In this analysis, I identify three primary 
‗dialogical frames‘ in which such references appear, labelling these: ‗Us vs. Them‘, ‗The 
Active Leader‘, and ‗The Moral Community‘. Many feminists have argued that these 
kinds of references are disingenuous ‗gender decoys‘. While politically motivated 
calculation clearly played a role in this discourse, I argue that ideology and identity must 
also be taken into account as influencing factors. In conclusion, while problematic, the 
use of such language by the Bush Administration (or any government for that matter) also 
presents a discursive opening through which more substantive change may be achieved. 
 
Keywords: Bush, Afghanistan, constructivism  
 
Introduction 
Since his earliest days in office, feminists have criticised George W. Bush for 
being what they perceive as hostile to ‗women‘s rights‘. In fact, many have argued that 
Bush‘s real war is not against terror, but rather against women, at home and around the 
world (Flanders et al 2004; Eisenstein 2006). Such criticism is not entirely unfair. Indeed 
throughout Bush‘s time in office, a wide range of domestic and foreign policies have had 
real detrimental impacts on women. Nonetheless, the claim that President Bush is simply 
‗anti-woman‘ is a vast oversimplification that fails to capture the true complexity of how 
ideas and language actually work to shape policy. In this paper I examine how and in 
what ways a rhetoric of ‗women‘s rights‘ entered into the official foreign policy 
discourse of the Bush Administration from the period of 2001-2004. Through a close 
reading of speeches, press releases, interviews and foreign policy statements, I identify 
three ‗dialogical frames‘, which, I argue, shed insight into the political and rhetorical 
manoeuvrings of the Bush Administration. By examining the ways that gender, identity 
and belief came to intersect with political realities during this period, I attempt to offer a 
partial explanation of how, why and to what effect such claims were made. 
Before I begin, it is necessary to first lay down a methodological groundwork. In 
this work, I draw together two different methodological foundations from two 
disciplines—feminist studies and the school of constructivism in international relations 
(IR). Traditionally, there has been a disciplinary gap between international relations and 
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feminist studies. For, while IR has in the past tended to ignore the ways in which 
international politics are influenced by cultural codes of masculinity, feminist scholars 
have likewise failed to theorise about international politics. Since the 1980s, however, 
critical feminist political theorists have begun attempting to fill this gap by examining the 
ways that politics is constructed and reproduced by material and ideational structures 
shaped by ‗gender‘—that is, how ‗socially constructed, fluid, politically relevant 
identities, values, conventions and practices conceived as masculine and/or feminine‘ are 
mapped in multidimensional ways onto political structures, rules and norms‘ (Beckwith 
131).
 ‗Gender‘ is relevant to the study of IR because ‗international processes have 
gender-differentiated consequences, and gender filters thought and practice‘ (Hooper 24). 
Historically, feminists argue, IR has been shaped according to the demands of hegemonic 
masculinity, resulting in a kind of international politics where certain kinds of values and 
norms are assumed to be natural and appropriate and others are either left out entirely or 
demonised. Likewise, traditional IR theory has tended to perpetuate a distorted, 
masculinist worldview, the validity of which relies on an understanding of politics and 
the state that ignores women, while at the same time obscuring the workings of 
patriarchal power (Tickner 1988). In response, feminist scholars of IR attempt to 
incorporate a worldview that takes account of women‘s experiences into empirical and 
theoretical explanations for the workings of international politics, aiming to create a more 
holistic understanding of politics by incorporating perspectives left out by the enormous 
body of male-oriented theory which is foundational to social science today (Ackerly et al; 
Steans 2006). The development of critical theories of IR—particularly those from the 
standpoint of constructivism—have contributed greatly to this project. For, emphasizing 
an ‗ontology of becoming‘, constructivists draw attention to the ways politics is shaped 
by a variety of influences, including the norms, values and identities that are so important 
to feminist political theory (Burchill et al 2005).   
My methodology in this paper is thus framed according to several basic 
ontological assumptions: that social and political action is shaped by ideas, norms and 
identities as well as by material structures; that such ‗shared knowledge‘ is an essential 
process by which meaning is generated, and that this takes place in part through 
discourse; that agents and structures in international politics are thus mutually 
constituted; that while such normative and ideational forces are not the only factors in IR, 
it is possible to study their effects in a systemic manner (albeit in a limited, tentative 
fashion); and that feminism, as a movement that engages both politically and 
ideologically with discourse production, is an excellent example of a potentially 
normative force whose influence can and should be examined. 
In this paper I utilise a method of scrutiny common to both constructivism and 
critical feminism—‗discourse analysis‘. ‗Discourse‘ refers to both the process and the 
product of meaning-formation, generally as articulated through language. According to 
Michel Foucault, discourse constructs, defines and produces the objects of our knowledge 
by governing the way these objects can be talked about. However, this process is far 
more complex than the simple utterance of words. Rather, discourse is about the 
formation of ideas, each of which has its own depths of meaning and genealogical past. 
All speech acts only gain their meaning through the network of other signifiers to which 
they belong. In any speech act, in-between explicit and instrumental linguistic references 
to issues and ideas, countless other strata of meaning can be found, subsumed in shared 
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contextualising assumptions, metaphors and symbolisms. These ‗dialogical frames‘ are 
reflections not only of the beliefs and identities of an individual speaker, but also those of 
the community in which he or she acts. 
Attempting to capture and analyse every single speech act containing references 
to ‗women‘s rights‘ and relevant to U.S. foreign policy over the course of four years 
would be an extremely difficult if not impossible. As a result, I draw my evidence for this 
project from a single pre-selected source—a database of speeches, statements and press 
conferences accumulated and made publicly available by the U.S. State Department. 
While no doubt limited, this database (which includes the voice of the President as well 
as a range of other official and unofficial spokespersons who speak on the behalf of his 
administration) provides an excellent cross-section of those ‗speech acts‘ that the 
Administration both believed to be significant to U.S. foreign policy and that it wished to 
transmit to a wider audience over time. Presidential administrations tend to carefully 
orchestrate particular ‗messages‘ even down to precise wordings, which all 
representatives are charged with duly repeating. As a result, I treat the totality of these 
many different ‗speech acts‘ as though they represent a single voice. Since my primary 
concern is the Administration‘s discursive references to themes and language of feminist-
origin, I read all speech acts that through their titles and/or subjects reflected this content. 
However, in order to capture those references that were not so immediately identifiable, I 
also conducted a randomised survey of the whole database ranging from the beginning of 




Ultimately, almost all of the speech acts identified in my analysis as containing 
‗women‘s rights‘ rhetoric utilised one of three dialogical frames. I call these: ‗Us vs. 
Them‘, ‗The Active Leader‘ and ‗The Moral Community‘. In each of these, metaphors of 
gender played a crucial role. Moreover, these dialogical frames often tied the 
Administration‘s specific claims about women‘s rights into larger narratives about the 
United States, its friends and its enemies that functioned to explain and justify broader 
U.S. foreign policy objectives. 
 
‘Us vs. Them’ 
The dichotomous cliché of ‗Us vs. Them‘ is a staple of political rhetoric. 
However, during the period from 2001-2004 it was used with a particular vehemence in 
specific ways in reference to women‘s rights. In this particular incarnation, the dialogical 
frame of Us vs. Them is characterised by descriptions of how women‘s human rights are 
violated in certain states around the world, which are then contrasted with a particular 
vision of the United States wherein it is presumed such things never happen. In doing so, 
it tends to focus on a relatively small handful of states that have been internationally 
labelled as human rights violators-- such countries as Sudan, Afghanistan, Burma, North 
Korea, China and Iraq – accusing them of a laundry list of anti-woman offences, 
describing both how bad things are in these ‗bad‘ states, and what the United States is 
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trying to do to improve the situation in those countries, be this by economic sanctions or 
targeted aid programmes. In this way, the United States is framed not only as innocent, 
but as fundamentally different from those ‗evil doers‘ elsewhere who have no respect for 
human life. The attention paid to these states‘ ‗lack of respect‘ for women only 
emphasises this point further, by drawing attention to the notion that they would harm 
those who are presumed to be incapable of defending themselves. 
The presumption of American innocence and righteousness that the Us vs. Them 
frame depends upon is rooted in a sense of American moral authority drawn from a 
particular national mythology that posits that the United States is not only the oldest and 
original modern democracy but that it was the first to respect ‗fundamental freedoms‘. As 
one U.S. Ambassador stated in his report on Human Rights to the UN:  
 
Americans speak from over 200 years of experience when we express our concern 
whenever fundamental liberties are suppressed. The United States has fought the 
battle for human rights and the dignity of humankind both at home and abroad, in 
war and peace . . . Ours is a country with global interests and a deep and abiding 
concern for the promotion of universal human rights in every country in the 
world. (Tahir-Kheli 3) 
 
The vision of rights and freedom assumed by the United States in the Us vs. Them frame 
is painted as the normative centre, while that of those in those ‗problem‘ states is viewed 
as abnormal, and even extreme: ‗Lamentably, there are a few in the world who consider 
these aspirations . . . a threat to their own warped plans for humanity‘ (Noriega 1). 
President Bush‘s famous ‗Axis of Evil‘ remarks in his 2002 State of the Union Address 
are a particularly strong example of this dialogical frame at work, taking the Us vs. Them 
concept so far as to place it literally in the religiously charged context of ‗good and evil‘, 
with the United States fated to the task of dishing out ‗justice‘ to ‗evil-doers‘ anywhere 
and everywhere in the world that might threaten its national interests. Thus, despite the 
claim that the United States has no interest in imposing its culture on others, Us vs. Them 
and the kinds of action it tends to legitimate, is predicated on the notion that what is good 
and right for America is good and right for the rest of the world.  
 Us vs. Them often draws upon claims about women--both at home and abroad-- 
that have long been used by those in power to explain and justify particular foreign 
policies. Just as European colonizers justified the domination and exploitation of other 
peoples by claiming to liberate native women from their base and oppressive cultures, the 
bad treatment of women in other countries today is used to justify ‗regime change‘ at the 
hands of the United States and its allies. As always, the protection of women‘s virtue, 
whether at home or abroad, is a sure-fire justification for war and domination (Elshtain 
1995). However, at the same time, the Us vs. Them frame also reformulates metaphors of 
gender in new ways.  Rather than simply protecting the passive women of the American 
homefront (whose vulnerability is not only appropriate but to be expected) from a 
tangible foreign enemy, the American soldier (who now can also be a woman) is tasked 
with protecting the right of women everywhere to be empowered. As Bush proclaimed in 
his 2001 remarks to the United Nations, the invasion of Afghanistan was not just about 
ousting the Taliban and catching Bin Laden, but about ending the brutalization of Afghan 
women. In this way, U.S. military action is framed as an event of rescue and but also one 
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of solidarity. For, by throwing its might behind the women, the United States is presented 
as supporting the victims and therefore the ‗good‘ side of the conflict. And yet the notion 
that the United States military could act as a medium for women‘s liberation is deeply 
flawed and in fact contradictory. For rescue and solidarity are two very different things. 
While ‗rescue‘ is often patronizing and undermining, ‗solidarity‘ suggests a kind of 
empowerment. In reality, the idea that fighting terrorism is synonymous with liberating 
women is a kind of doublespeak, as it is not possible for the United States act in both of 
these ways simultaneously. As the women of Afghanistan themselves proclaimed prior to 
the invasion: ‗A vast and indiscriminate military attack on a country that has been facing 
permanent disasters for more than two decades will not be a matter of pride . . . The U.S. 
government and people should know that there is a vast difference between the poor and 
devastated people of Afghanistan and the Jihadi and Taliban criminals‘ (Hawthorne and 
Winter 2002, 38). The result instead tends to be policies that while acted out in the name 
of women abroad, are far removed from these women‘s control and even support.3 
 The Us vs. Them frame played a dominant role in the discourse around the United 
States‘ involvement in Afghanistan following its invasion of the country in 2001. 
Beginning in November of that year, with a series of speeches and interviews about the 
anti-woman policies of the Taliban, a significant volume of discourse began to emerge 
from the White House and the Department of State, which emphasized the pro-women‘s 
rights stance of the United States and contrasted this with the anti-woman attitudes of 
‗those terrorists‘ who would impose their barbaric ideals on the rest of us. In the months 
that followed, the Bush Administration made a very clear effort to link its activities in 
Afghanistan with a larger values-struggle, using the advancement of women as a key 
means of distinguishing a ‗civilized‘ United States from the terrorists ‗out there‘ and 
thereby justifying the toppling of the Taliban regime. After September 11
th
 issues of 
culture, religion and political rights became the sites of a perceived ideological clash 
between ‗civilisation‘ and ‗barbarism‘, and ‗women‘s rights‘ a focus of renewed attention 
(Ferguson 2005; Shepherd 2006; Tickner 2002). Our Freedom (which included the 
emancipation of our women) became the explanation for why ‗they‘ hated us.  
Meanwhile, after being virtually ignored for years Afghan women were suddenly thrown 
into the international limelight, as the embodiment of the backwards and barbaric reality 
that Al Queda fanatics were allegedly seeking to impose on the entire world.  As First 
Lady Laura Bush proclaimed in her 2001 radio address to the nation: ‗The brutal 
oppression of women is a central goal of the terrorists . . . In Afghanistan, we see the 
world the terrorists would like to impose on the rest of us‘ (qtd. in Khattak 221). In this 
vein, the Bush Administration began to speak of women‘s emancipation as though it were 
part and parcel of the War on Terror, with Bush insisting on September 20th, 2001 that 
‗the fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women‘ (1). 
However, despite these claims, whether or not such acts actually represented any kind of 
true solidarity or support for these women is highly questionable.  
                                                            
3 Muslim women throughout the world strongly opposed the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan, arguing that 
these were only likely to result in further destruction and death for Muslim women, both directly by 
American bombs and indirectly by the backlash against the West and anything associated with it likely to 
result in response. 
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The Active Leader 
Another important dialogical frame utilised in official U.S. foreign policy 
discourse in reference to ‗women‘s rights‘ is that of ‗The Active Leader‘. Within such a 
frame, the Bush Administration claims to be a kind of ‗rights crusader‘, that seeks in an 
almost messianic way to spread human rights values (read: women‘s rights) around the 
world. In this sense U.S. foreign policy following September 11
th
 was seen not just as a 
logical response to an attack on American soil, but rather as the product of an almost 
fated ‗higher calling‘, by which the United States must defend the core values of Western 
Civilisation for the betterment of all humankind. As the President himself proclaimed in 
his 2002 State of the Union address: ‗In a single instant we realised that this will be a 
decisive decade in the history of liberty, that we‘ve been called to a unique role in human 
events . . . Our enemies embrace tyranny and death as a cause and creed. We stand for a 
different choice, made long ago, on the day of our founding‘ (3). Hence, like the Us vs. 
Them frame, the Active Leader relies on a series of assumptions about the moral 
legitimacy of the United States that is rooted in a particular national ideology, which 
claims that because Americans are the most freedom-loving people in the world, their 
government is the best suited to spread and protect freedom anywhere in the world: ‗Our 
aim is a democratic peace – a peace founded upon the dignity and rights of every man 
and woman. America acts in this cause with friends and allies at our side, yet we 
understand our special calling: This great republic will lead the cause of freedom‘ (2004, 
3).  
The Active Leader frame has long been a part of the way U.S. foreign policy is 
framed and understood. During the Cold War, for example, the notion that the United 
States was the leader of ‗The Free World‘ and fated with the task of defending it from 
Soviet Tyranny was fundamental to the way the United States conducted itself 
internationally. Under the Bush Administration, the Active Leader has often taken its 
shape according to the traditional masculinist tropes of the righteous hero or benevolent 
guardian. The case of human trafficking, wherein the American state has taken on the 
responsibility of both speaking for and rescuing victimised women around the world is 
one particular example of this.  
However, the Active Leader has also taken on new dimensions under the Bush 
Administration, becoming at times far more amorphous. While sometimes the Active 
Leader behaves like the epitome of manly rationality and civic responsibility, he 
transforms at others to a more feminine form, as a thoroughly modern but very caring 
‗superwoman‘, who is capable of taking on anything and everything, and does just that, 
tirelessly leading the way for those others who are presumed to need the help. The 
‗superwoman‘ trope is especially evident in the way the Administration has sought to 
portray American women in the armed forces. While the dominant representation of the 
U.S. military since 2001 has been one of overwhelming masculinity, those women who 
have made the news have tended to reinforce the notion that like the U.S. government, 
the American military also has a feminine side—which is nimble and ‗caring‘ as well as 
professional.
 
Thus, in a manner similar to the Us vs. Them frame, the Active Leader is in 
many ways legitimated by a particular construction of women‘s liberation. Like 
‗Democracy‘, women‘s advancement is seen as a fundamental value that the United 
States is morally bound to spread around the world. However, in this case women‘s 
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liberation is framed far less in terms of being threatened, but rather in an optimistic 
fashion. Women at ‗home‘ within America are seen less as vulnerable and in need of 
protection, but rather as models for what other women the world over can aspire to be, 
while empowered women abroad are treated as evidence that U.S. foreign policies on 
women‘s rights are both correct and working.  
The Active Leader frame has played a prominent role in a number of U.S. foreign 
policies under the Bush Administration, from relatively small and low profile programs 
aimed at providing American expertise and training to women leaders from foreign 
countries to an array of economic development initiatives aimed at fostering an 
‗American-style entrepreneurial spirit‘ in women around the world. In each of these 
cases, it is claimed that ‗the United States is the champion of human rights and the well 
being of women and minorities worldwide‘, and that as a result, pro-woman measures 
make up a fundamental component U.S. foreign policy (Palmerlee, ‗Creating‘ 1). One of 
the biggest examples of the Active Leader frame can be seen in the U.S. policy on human 
trafficking. On this particular issue, the Bush Administration has framed itself has the 
world‘s leading anti-trafficking advocate, taking on the problem everywhere through a 
wide range of foreign policy initiatives, and engaging both via international institutions 
and through bilateral negotiations to criminalise and prosecute traffickers. In both written 
reports and numerous speeches, the U.S. presents human trafficking as one of the most 
atrocious human rights violations in existence, and one that ‗must stop‘ (Ely-Raphel 1). 
As the Active Leader, it is presumed, the United States is not only able to set an example 
for how human trafficking ought to be addressed (by ‗rescuing‘, liberating and 
rehabilitating women throughout the world via the coordinated efforts of American law 
enforcement and women‘s aid groups), but is the appropriate figure to judge others on 
their anti-trafficking activities (or lack of them). Consequently, in addition to extensive 
diplomatic activities, the Bush Administration has published annual ‗Trafficking in 
Persons Reports‘ that assess every state in the world (but unsurprisingly not the U.S.) on 
the issue of human trafficking, giving each country a rating which is then tied to aid 
funding, punishing those countries that fail to meet the Administration‘s standards.  
 
The Moral Community 
When President George W. Bush‘s first entered office, the foreign policy he 
advocated was in many ways unilateralist and isolationist, encouraging the United States 
to pull back from its involvement in a large number of international programmes and 
initiatives (Daalder and Lindsay). However, soon after the attacks on September 11
th
, this 
trend reversed and a third important dialogical frame emerged as an important theme in 
U.S. foreign policy rhetoric on women‘s rights—the Moral Community. According to 
this frame, the United States is presented as being a good participant in an international 
community that is defined by the shared value of Freedom—free markets, free elections, 
and to some degree, personal liberty. While the United States is almost always presented 
as being an essential leader in this community, the dialogical frame of the Moral 
Community is distinct from the Active Leader because it emphasizes to a far greater 
degree a sense of connectivity between the United States and its fellows: ‗The people of 
the world are inexorably linked, in today‘s world, that which touches some touches all‘ 
(Beers 1). The war on terrorism throws this connectivity into sharp relief. As one 
Administration representative noted: ‗On September 11, our innocence ended, and we 
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entered the post-post-Cold War world, a period when increasingly potent transnational 
challenges intersect with still important traditional concerns. The attacks were a grim 
reminder of how the march of globalization has raised the stakes from transnational 
threats‘ (Haass 2). At the same time, the Moral Community is diverse, including friends 
throughout the world of many different ethnicities and faiths.  Throughout the 
community, a concern for the human rights of women is treated as an essential and 
defining expression of the kinds of freedoms that link together its members:  
 
Protecting human rights is an integral part of belonging to the global community. 
And women‘s rights are human rights…It is at the core of building a civil-law 
abiding society, which is an indispensable prerequisite for true democracy. 
(Palmerlee, ‗Women‘ 1)  
 
In such a configuration, the individual liberty of women is seen as essentially connected 
to Freedom writ-large, within the marketplace, the society and the political sphere, and 
thus as a result, it is seen both as a necessary step in achieving these broader goals, and as 
evidence that they are being achieved. In the Moral Community, this particular ‗respect 
for women‘ becomes part of the civilisation that members of the community purport to 
share. 
The Moral Community also takes its imagined shape according to specific 
metaphors of gender. In late 2001, the Moral Community first emerged in the discourse 
of the Bush Administration as having many of the attributes of the Wild West, with the 
Bush Administration acting as the hyper-masculine ‗sheriff‘. Drawing a great deal from 
the language of the Western movie genre, Bush proclaimed to be getting ‗tough‘ on 
terrorism and bringing justice down; he stated, on September 24th, 2001, that Bin Laden 
was wanted ‗dead or alive‘ and that the United States would ‗smoke [Al Queda] out of 
their caves and get them running‘ (5). Just like the town marshal in the film High Noon, 
President Bush claimed to take up the job of passing down retribution to Al Queda as an 
act of duty because it was the right and necessary thing to do for the welfare of the whole 
community. However, in doing so, he demanded allegiance from its members, noting that 
if necessary the United States would act alone.
4
 Those who were not ‗with us‘, it was 
implied, were ‗against us‘ and therefore not legitimate members of the community but 
betrayers or outlaws. In accordance with this theme, the only appropriate solution for the 
Bush Administration was one of violence—a literal ‗show down‘ with terrorism. In this 
way, the Moral Community at times takes on qualities of Us vs. Them. For, such crises 
force a literal redrawing of who is ‗in‘ and who is ‗out‘. 
However, even as President Bush made headlines with his tough ‗cowboy‘ talk, 
the Administration‘s official discourse on the Moral Community also drew on less 
extreme versions of masculinity. The most important of these was that of the statesman. 
According to this metaphor, President Bush acts as a kind of world‘s diplomat who is 
assertive but also clever and prone to deal making and cooperation. Unlike the 
cowboy/sheriff, the statesman is an intellectual who emphasizes the complexity of 
international politics and his own expertise in being able to engage in the art of 
diplomacy. Examples of this metaphor abounded in the months immediately after 
                                                            
4 See High Noon (dir. Fred Zinneman, 1952). 
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, as the Bush Administration sought to emphasize the degree of 
international cooperation that was going into the military actions against Afghanistan, 
and once again in 2003 in its discussion of the ‗Coalition of the Willing‘ to invade Iraq. 
Often used to hold off criticism of particular U.S. foreign policies, such as support for 
foreign leaders like the Saudi royal family or former President Musharraf of Pakistan, 
Bush would insist, as he did on September 16th, 2001, that we were acting along with our 
‗many friends and allies‘ in a complicated and multifaceted diplomatic front against the 
United States‘ enemies. However the ‗cooperation‘ and ‗dialogue‘ emphasized by the 
statesman should not be confused with the feminine connotations of give and take. 
Rather, virtually all of the collaboration in War on Terror would be configured with the 
U.S. still ‗in charge‘. It is significant that President Bush calls upon the world to ‗join us‘ 
not for the world to ‗join together‘ (‗Remarks‘ September 16, 2001). 
Whether President Bush is portrayed as a chivalrous cowboy or good mannered 
diplomat, women in the Moral Community are largely subjects rather than participants. 
For, even though the status of women is an important marker for membership in the 
Moral Community, and a point upon which its members are often galvanised, they are 
virtually absent as participants. Though on occasion women act as spokespersons 
(Condelezza Rice, who never deviates in the least from the White House‘s formal stance 
on anything would even fall into this category), women within the Moral Community 
have no distinct voice, almost always affirming the (usually foregone) conclusions 
dictated by the many men ‗in charge‘. Hence, in the lead up to the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, the only female voices recognised and given a platform were those that 
supported a military response (Hunt 2002).  
The Moral Community was employed with a particular vehemence in the months 
following September 11
th
, 2001, when Bush began calling on the ‗civilized‘ world (or 
‗friends and allies‘) to draw and defend its boundaries. As President Bush told the United 
Nations General Assembly in November of 2001: ‗This threat cannot be ignored.  This 
threat cannot be appeased. Civilization, itself, the civilization we share, is threatened . . . 
The civilized world has to go after terrorism‘ (2). By early 2002, it had become apparent 
that if the United States was going to beat Bin Laden, in the Middle East or anywhere 
else for that matter, it was going to be necessary for the Bush Administration to articulate 
a counter to Al Queda‘s moral rhetoric. The place of women in society and politics—as 
an issue that not only encompasses questions of equality and liberty but that also tends to 
be seen as a marker of modernisation and progress—was the perfect subject upon which 
such a values debate (and with it, the debate over who was and was not civilised) could 
be focused. As a result, the status of a nation‘s women quickly become a site for the 
affirmation of who is and is not part of the Moral Community: ‗The international 
coalition for the war on terrorism . . . stands for the safety, resolve and liberation of 
people in countries everywhere, especially for women‘ (Beers 1). Of course, what this 
‗liberation‘ has meant in practice has been an entirely different matter altogether. 
Regardless of what the Bush Administration claims, the War on Terror is not the same 
thing as the struggle for women‘s rights, and even in places like Afghanistan, where 
‗women‘s rights‘ has figured so centrally, the results of this pairing have not been all 
good. Rather, many argue, the effect of the war there has been disastrous for many 
Afghan women and the United States‘ efforts to empower them poorly suited to the 
actual realities of their lives (Daulatzai 2006; Kandiyoti 2005; Hunt 2002; Shepherd 
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 ‘Gender Decoys’ or Genuine Belief? 
Many would argue that the Bush Administration‘s discursive references to 
‗women‘s rights‘ are nothing more than ‗ gender decoys‘—attempts to confuse and 
mystify perceptions of its actual agendas, that while making claims for women‘s rights 
actually work to justify and uphold patriarchal structures that ultimately undermine such 
progress (Eisenstein 2006). Indeed, on at least one level, it is clear that in many ways the 
utilization of feminist language and concepts in U.S. foreign policy discourse during this 
period was a product of political calculations. From the moment George W. Bush was 
sworn in as the 43
rd
 president of the United States, he was already disliked by feminists 
the world over. During his time as Governor of Texas, he had already established a 
political agenda that advocated traditional roles for women and strongly opposed long-
time feminist causes such as the right to choose abortion and affirmative action. Thus, 
despite the effort to paint his campaign as one of ‗compassionate conservatism‘, the lead-
up to Bush‘s first term election was marked by protests by many feminists that his whole 
platform was ‗anti-woman‘. Throughout, and even following, his election in 2000, 
support for Bush among women voters remained abysmally low, with the ‗gender gap‘ 
between male and female voters as high as it had ever been since the election of Ronald 
Regan (Flanders 2005; Hutchings et al 2004).  
In response, Bush made clear efforts from the very beginning to present himself 
as a ‗pro-woman‘ candidate, from commenting on the achievement of greater equality 
between men and women as a significant step forward (Frum 2003), to sending high-
profile female supporters, such as the First Lady and the infamous political handler Karen 
Hughes, around the country in a bid to draw the support of middle class, suburban 
women (Mitchell 2000). In the effort to appeal to women, the Bush Administration not 
only sought to address those issues it was believed these voters would be most concerned 
with, but to tailor the language of Presidential speeches and Administration statements in 
order to appeal to what was seen as a womanly sensibility (Frum 2003). When one takes 
such strategising into account, it is very likely that the inclusion of claims of support for 
liberal feminist ideals such as formal legal equality of the sexes, the defence of women‘s 
political rights and the promotion of women‘s economic independence were at least in 
part seen as a way of building support among the female electorate, especially those in 
the demographic Bush had the most difficulty reaching—single working women 
(Hutchings et al 2004).  
Aside from appealing to women voters at home, the Bush Administration‘s 
references to women‘s rights in its foreign policy discourse also served political purposes 
abroad—the United States‘ need for international legitimacy. For, despite the unilateral 
tendencies of the Bush Doctrine, virtually all of the foreign policies pursued by the Bush 
Administration from 2001-2004 relied upon some degree of international sanction if not 
help. As a participant in the international system, the United States is subject to a variety 
of interdependent relationships—conceptually as well as practically--not only with other 
states, but with intergovernmental organisations and even non-governmental ones, from 
international advocacy groups to multi-national corporations. Inevitably, these 
interrelationships play an important role in setting the agenda of the United States‘ 
foreign policies and its discourse on them (Brown et al 2005). Much of this inter-
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dependence comes from the norm-dependant nature of inter-state relations. For, whether 
the aim of a relationship is trade, security, or otherwise, all forms of international 
cooperation are fundamentally rooted in shared understandings and expectations. Within 
the international political system this is especially important, as membership to this 
‗community‘ of states can only be gained and affirmed by participation in certain 
institutions and values systems. In this community, legitimacy is not something to be 
taken for granted, but rather is subject to a certain ‗universal‘ regime of ethics in which 
the rights of women increasingly figure prominently (Kerr 1993). For, since the rise of 
‗human security‘ and states‘ movement toward the practice of ‗ethical‘ foreign policy, the 
emphasis throughout the international community has increasingly moved away from 
state sovereignty and toward states‘ responsibility to protect certain rights of civilians 
(Chandler 2003).  
That the United States would seek to present itself in a certain way with regard to 
women‘s rights as a means of achieving international legitimacy is nothing new at all. As 
Steve Niva argues, examples of this particular kind of political manoeuvring date back to 
the end of the Cold War: ‗The old bipolar configuration of global power and norms had 
given away to a new uni-polar world, in particular to renewed claims to universalism and 
benevolence, and grave proclamations of responsibility on the part of the United States. 
With the Gulf War, the United States asserted itself as the social paradigm for 
international society‘ (111). In this same way, one could argue, the Bush Administration 
has used certain claims about its respect for women and support for women‘s rights 
within its foreign policy discourse to ‗prop up‘ its ‗sagging‘ hegemony. For by making 
such claims, the Bush Administration was able to not only indicate its awareness of these 
issues, but to generate some of the political goodwill necessary for the United States to 
maintain its moral legitimacy as a ‗world leader‘, even as it continued to insist upon its 
exceptionality, opposing a wide variety of international agreements, including CEDAW, 
and claiming itself to be exempt from long-established international norms for behaviour, 
from pre-emptive war to the Geneva Conventions. 
On the surface of things, such politically motivated lip service to women‘s rights 
seems incredibly disingenuous, especially when one takes a full account of the many 
Bush Administration policies, both at home and abroad, that do undermine, if not harm, 
women. Nonetheless, the Bush Administration‘s adoption of certain feminist phrases and 
concepts should not be entirely dismissed as solely the result of political calculation. 
Rather, a reasonable case can be made that to at least some degree, these claims were also 
rooted in these figures‘ identities and beliefs. 
Because identity mediates the way we see and interpret the world, references to 
identities in discourse not only act as rhetorical tools, but also reflect the ways 
policymakers actually understand things. Consequently, to at least some degree, rhetoric 
is always drawn from some aspect of genuine conviction, in so much as policymakers 
will always relate their arguments and claims to their own beliefs in a way that affirms 
their sense of individual and national self (Reus-Smit 2005). In addition to helping shape 
discourse, identity can also be influenced by it. For once certain concepts and phrases 
enter the lexicon of policymakers, they eventually begin to inform the way these 
individuals see not only the problems before them, but how they see their nation and in 
fact themselves. Or, to put it simply—say something enough times and you will likely 
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start to believe it. Once this happens, the influence of a particular identity becomes 
compounded and self-reinforcing.  
David Campbell argues in a country where the national identity was constructed 
from the ground up in a relatively short period of time and where there is no common 
cultural ancestry of people and place, the imagined nation is centrally important for the 
United States.  For certain, he contends, identities have always played an essential role in 
the political evolution of the United States. Americans‘ perception that theirs is a nation 
of great freedoms, unparalleled power, moral righteousness, global leadership, and 
economic strength is essential to the way they relate to the rest of the world. Elements of 
these beliefs can be found everywhere in U.S. foreign policy discourse, including those 
speech acts that make reference to feminist concepts and language. They figure 
prominently in each of dialogical frames of Us vs. Them, the Active Leader and the 
Moral Community. 
Ultimately, when one takes into account the co-constitutive nature of identity and 
U.S. foreign policy, it is not only logical but to be expected that on at least some level, 
key policymakers see themselves as being in favour of women‘s rights and the United 
States as a legitimate model for women‘s empowerment that is worthy of export. Hence, 
even though the Bush Administration may not share the same agenda as most feminists 
and might even be hostile to it, it is inaccurate to discount its use of at least certain 
feminist concepts and language as being entirely strategic and disconnected from any real 
concern for women. Rather, in many ways, the Bush Administration‘s professed pro-
women‘s rights stance can be attributed to a genuine belief in the goodness of certain 
kinds of individual ‗fundamental‘ freedoms to which all people ought to be entitled—
such freedoms as President Bush extolled in his 2002 National Security Strategy:  
 
The United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are 
right and true for all people everywhere . . . America must defend the 
nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute 
power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for 
women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property [emphasis 
added]. (National Security Strategy 2002, 3)  
 
In the end, though a great deal of foreign policy develops as a result of strategic 
calculations, it is not only reasonable but undeniable that identity and belief also play 
important roles in shaping how leaders both think and speak about it. While the Bush 
Administration had clear motivations to appeal to the sympathies of both women at home 
and others in the international community, it is not unreasonable to believe that in at least 
some sense, these many statements were also impacted by their convictions. President 
Bush and those who represent him see themselves and their country as being modern, 
civilised, and benevolent—working for the greater wellbeing and good of people around 
the world, including women. Their belief in promoting Freedom—free markets, political 
freedom, and personal liberty (with a few notable exceptions, such as gay marriage and 
abortion)—is central to this. As a result, even though those in the Bush Administration 
would hardly characterise themselves as being feminists, they were perfectly willing to 
adopt feminist-influenced language and concepts, when doing so furthered their sense of 
self and nation.  
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In conclusion, while the Bush Administration clearly drew upon a foundation of 
language and issues that were first and foremost established by the women‘s movement, 
the result was not necessarily a ‗feminist‘ foreign policy. Ironically, even as the Bush 
Administration claimed to be promoting the empowerment and advancement of women, 
it often relied on metaphors and symbolic meanings rooted in long-standing gender 
stereotypes. In many cases, these assumptions had an undermining effect. Similarly, at 
the concrete level, it is unclear whether the claims made were ever actually backed up 
with genuine and legitimate action. Ultimately, the kind of ‗liberation‘ advocated was 
always situated within a particular pre-existing moral and philosophical framework, and 
the actions taken to achieve it within the context of other, larger foreign policies. Hence, 
whenever mainstream feminist demands or claims clearly came into conflict with this 
framework, the result was either vague and non-specific language, or outright silence (it 
should be noted that the Bush Administration never once bragged about cutting funds for 
international family planning programmes, nor about its continuing failure to sign on to 
CEDAW). As a result, a strong case can be made that on at least some occasions, pro-
women‘s rights language was used as a proxy measure for the furthering of other political 
agendas. In any case, for all the Administration‘s ‗talk‘ of promoting ‗the full and equal 
participation of women in all aspects of life‘ (Powell 2002: 1) there remained a tension 
between the Bush Administration‘s discursive claims and the actual, practical ends of the 
policies to which such statements were usually attached.  
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the claims the Bush Administration made about 
women‘s rights were entirely disingenuous. In judging their validity, one must also take 
into account the roles of identity and belief. In many cases, the Administration‘s ‗pro-
women‘s rights‘ rhetoric may have been tied to genuine conviction. In these situations, 
the potential for an effective and meaningful impact on U.S. foreign policy was and 
remains significant. Indeed, the fact that many feminist concerns even entered the 
discourse at all during the period of 2001-2004, when both the President and majority 
party were openly hostile to the feminist movement, is evidence that the paradigm for 
what ‗counts‘ in international politics and on what basis foreign policy ought to be made 
is already shifting, and with this shift, policymakers are now beginning incorporate new 
viewpoints into their considerations and speech. The question now, is how we as 
feminists ought to take these gains and utilize these discursive openings in the best way 
possible to bring about a greater coherence between speech and action, so that politicians 
not only talk of feminism but incorporate its principles and values into the real substance 
of their policies. 
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